Why CIA Analysts Were So Doubtful About Vietnam

It is well documented and well known that for decades CIA analysts were skeptical of official pronouncements about the Vietnam war and consistently fairly pessimistic about the outlook for light at the end of the tunnel. Less well known is why the Agencys analysts were so doubtful, especially because CIA was all the while a central player in US operational efforts to create and strengthen South Vietnam. Thus, it is important to examine the sources of CIA analysts doubts about successive administrations repeated assurances and claims. Not all CIA analysts thought alike, and at times there were substantial differences of view. Skepticism and pessimism about Vietnam were present chiefly among those officers who produced finished intelligence in the form of National Intelligence Estimates and in Intelligence Directorate then the DDI publications that is, analysts in the Office of National Estimates ONE, the Office of Economic Research and Reports, and the South Vietnam Branch of the Office of Current Intelligence OCI. Such views were generally a bit less evident among officers of the North Vietnam Branch of OCI, many of whom had been transferred there from previous Soviet and North Korean assignments. The situation among the Agencys operational offices at home and abroad was mixed some enthusiastically shared official White House views, while others were remarkably caustic. In more than a few cases, the Intelligence Communitys IC coordination processes and top CIA officers muted doubts about Vietnam expressed in CIAs analytic ranks, yet the finished intelligence produced by the DDI and ONE maintained definitely pessimistic, skeptical tones over the years.