Continuous Operations in Europe: Feasibility and the Effects of Leadership and Training

The offensive...will be conducted night and day, in any weather, without letup until the enemy is defeated. With these words, Soviet author A. A. Sidorenko summarizes an element of Soviet military doctrine which has significance for the US, although we have only recently begun to appreciate it. Our current model of the next European war is based on conflict between Warsaw Pact and NATO forces, with the latter waging a determined and aggressive defense against an enemy vastly superior in personnel, armor, and artillery. Strategy and tactics have been revised to counter this numerical disparity, but seldom has the issue of continuous operations been addressed, beyond acknowledgement that they may well be required. The NATO approach still clings to the notion that there are only a few operations suited for nigh. Approach marches, withdrawals, river crossings, and reconnaissance are billed as natural nighttime activities. Combat itself is presented as a problem for technology, to be solved by more and better night vision devices. All this is true, of course, but it tends to hid the issue. Night fighting capability is unquestionably necessary for continuous operations, but it alone is just as surely not sufficient.