Army Unit Cohesion in Vietnam: A Bum Rap

The recently implemented program of the Army regimental system perhaps best typifies the current perception of the linkage between primary group cohesion and fighting power. Curiously, the U.S. Army decided on this program based on one of the very factors Richard H. Kohn cited in support of his argument, the loosening of unit ties caused by personnel policies during the Vietnam War. By being assigned individually and without regard to previous unit association, it was reasoned, the soldier did not develop personal or unit loyalties and perceived his environment only in terms of his own security, an egocentric creed which the one-year tour accentuated. Indeed, several commentators, particularly Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage in Crisis in Command, maintain that unenlightened personnel policies -- individual rotation among them -- caused U.S. Army, Vietnam USARV, to all but disintegrate in the final years of that conflict. Yet, is it true that Army personnel policies had such an inimical effect on unit performance There are no conclusive studies of cohesion and fighting power during the Vietnam War, or for World War II and the Korean War. Nevertheless, there exists a body of literature critical of individual rotation policies during the Vietnam War and their deleterious effects. With few exceptions, the writers are civilian. Although no authoritative research exists, a large body of personal memoirs and incidental studies does provide the basis for an examination of the interrelationship between personnel policies and unit performance in Vietnam. I contend that individual rotation did not adversely affect the unit cohesion which sustained American soldiers in combat throughout most of the Vietnam War even though other personnel policies did not take adequate cognizance of group dynamics.