"On War": Is Clausewitz Still Relevant?

Carl von Clausewitz occupies a position of well-deserved prominence in the small pantheon of Western military theorists. He bequeathed to us, in his unfinished masterpiece Vom Kriege, a trove of provocative ideas, many of which retain remarkable contemporary value. But modern soldiers and statesmen cannot redeem the full value of Clausewitzs legacy if they fail to subject his propositions to serious debate. One facet of Clausewitzian theory that warrants revisiting is his very concept of war. Is it sufficiently comprehensive for modern American warriors and statesmen I think not. For example, his singular concern for ground warfare was restrictive in its own time, let alone today when huge navies and air forces allow nations to project power far beyond the limits he could have imagined. This article will focus specifically on three important developments that defy neat inclusion in Clausewitzs construct. The first of these, modern nuclear weaponry, is only the most dramatic of a series of technological achievements that make possible methods of warfare radically different from what Clausewitz could conceive. The second development I will call transnational constabulary warfare. Combating modern terrorism or large drug dealing enterprises may require nations to mount warlike efforts against amorphous and shadowy transnational networks -- an idea rather far removed from the Clausewitzian concept of war between states obliging the clash of opposing field armies. The third development is in the area of modern statecraft, which differs from the kind with which Clausewitz was familiar.