Building a Better Legacy: Contrasting the British and American Experiences in Iraq

The U.S. invasion of Iraq and its continued presence has been costly in terms of lives, money, and global reputation. Britain suffered the same consequences in Iraq during its post-World War I mandate. In both cases, the United States and Britain attempted Iraqi state-building following the initial successes of their invasions, but they were met with significant political and social obstacles. Critics of the U.S. invasion often state that the American administration should have heeded the lessons learned from British Mandate. This thesis will carefully examine the case studies of the British Mandate and the U.S. involvement in Iraq to show that the two experiences are not identical. Firstly, the ideological motivation and impetus for the invasions differ substantially. The U.S. notion of stability and security through democracy is arguably more conducive to state-building than the underlying imperialist motivations of the British. Moreover, the progression of World Time has created a dissimilar operational environment between the two invasions and state-building endeavors. It is hoped that the U.S. state-building venture will yield better results and create a more stable Iraq than the British Mandate did.