Reassessing the Individual Ready Reserve's Role in the Marine Corps Total Force
Abstract:
The Reserve Component of the Marine Corps -- the manpower assets considered a part of the Total Force but not of the Active Component -- is employed today in ways and numbers never considered during the Cold War era. To meet the manpower requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq reserve personnel have augmented the Total Force in unprecedented levels over the past 7 years. By all accounts the reserves have transformed from a strategic asset to an operational force. But the use of reserves as an operational force has been limited to the Selected Reserve, while the Individual Ready Reserve IRR is still largely considered a strategic asset to be used as a last resort on an involuntary basis. The Break Glass in Case of Emergency mindset is still prevalent in the decision making that occurs with IRR Involuntary Mobilizations. Unfortunately, maintaining the IRR as a strategic asset is not viable during prolonged periods of conflict. The readiness of the IRR declined from 2003 to 2007 even though a large-scale Involuntary Mobilization did not occur. When the Presidential Authority to involuntarily mobilize 2,500 Marines in 2007 did materialize, the Marine Corps Mobilization Command struggled to find qualified candidates. The most opportune time to involuntarily mobilize the IRR is at the beginning of a conflict. In keeping with the MAID-P, the Presidential Authority to mobilize the IRR at the beginning gives the Marine Corps a wealth of manpower that will not be available later on when Marines begin to discharge from the Marine Corps. The author concludes that the IRR should be used as an operational force at the onset of major conflict. This will strengthen the overall Total Force concept and maintain a higher level of manpower availability for a longer period of time.