The Object Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition

In the most basic sense, an insurgency is a competition for power. According to British Brigadier General Frank Kitson, there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity. U.S. Field Manual Interim 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations, defines insurgency as organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in an insurgency. In any struggle for political power there are a limited number of tools that can be used to induce men to obey. These tools are coercive force, economic incentive and disincentive, legitimating ideology, and traditional authority. These tools are equally available to insurgent and counterinsurgent forces. From the perspective of the population, neither side has an explicit or immediate advantage in the battle for hearts and minds. The civilian population will support the side that makes it in its interest to obey. The regard for ones own benefit or advantage is the basis for behavior in all societies, regardless of religion, class, or culture. Iraqis, for example, will decide to support the insurgency or government forces based on a calculation of which side on balance best meets their needs for physical security, economic well-being, and social identity. The central goal in counterinsurgency operations, then, is to surpass the adversary in the effective use of the four tools. Past counterinsurgency campaigns offer a number of lessons about how to conduct and how not to conduct counterinsurgency using the four tools of political competition. These lessons have potential relevance for current operations in Iraq.