Negotiations on Vietnam, 1954-1966

The political problem that exists today in Vietnam is the same problem that the Geneva Accords of 1954 attempted to solve, but did not. The basic issue was then, and is now, whether or not Vietnam is to come under Communist domination. The four elements of the Geneva Accords were the Viet-Minh-French armistice, the joint declaration of the participating nations, and the unilateral position statements by South Vietnam and the United States. These documents clearly reflect the divergence of opinion on such basic issues as the mechanics of unification of Vietnam. The Communist Viet-Minh are sometimes credited with benevolence in a situation where they might have made greater demands. Their restraint was not engendered by kindly feelings but by fear of U.S. intervention if their demands were too unreasonable. Discussions on negotiations today rarely address themselves to negotiable issues. There are no such issues, unless one side or the other curtails or postpones its objectives. Negotiations must lead to victory for our side or for the Communist side. A victory for one is a defeat for the other. Our willingness to negotiate implies a readiness to accept defeat, whether it be partial or total. The United States can dictate the terms of negotiations if it so desires. It has the means to carry out its objectives. The determinant is the national will which we are able to mobilize in support of our Asian objectives. If that national will is properly mobilized and employed, the Communists will ultimately be the side asking for negotiations. Such negotiations must accommodate U.S. objectives. This essay presents and clarifies the most pertinent features of the 1954 Accords, comments briefly on their impact on subsequent events, and discusses current proposals for negotiations.