Learning to Leave. The Preeminence of Disengagement in US Military Strategy

Even before the release of the Iraq Study Group Report, a storm was brewing over how and when United States US forces should withdraw from Iraq. This study suggests the problems of disengagement have deeper roots than the start of the insurgency in Iraq. A larger and more serious problem is overlooked while policy makers and pundits argue over how to disengage from Iraq. No one seems to be asking why the US military repeatedly finds itself in this spot. This paper examines the tendency for the US military to remain engaged in regions well after victory occurs. Moreover, it explores the use of the military instrument of national power in situations not including combat operations. Ultimately, this study seeks to answer the question Does the congruence in language between national security strategy NSS and national military strategy NMS actually discourage disengagement, by misaligning means to ends, as national security strategy becomes more expansive This study posits a systemic flaw in the translation of grand strategy in the form of NSS into NMS. By consciously considering the need for disengagement in US military strategic calculus, the nation preserves the policy potential of military force. Todays question, How do we disengage in Iraq is an issue because the United States fails to distinguish between engagement in military terms and the other elements of national power diplomacy, information, and economics. This study follows a systematic approach, positing propositions, offering support, and consolidating lessons for future policy makers. Theoretical underpinnings of disengagement are laid out, and then post World War II military interventions are examined as minicases. Primary sources consist of such policy documents as the NSS and NMS reports. Secondary sources include written accounts of recent wars.