Exploiting Tribal Networks through Conflict

In the current fight against Islamic extremism, the United States is challenged in its ability to isolate and target specific individuals and groups in select regional environments. These particularly troublesome environments are characterized by a lack of State control and are populated with fiercely independent, largely Muslim, and anti-western communities. Unable to consistently penetrate and influence these ungoverned regions, operational intelligence remains sporadic and opportunities limited. No broader, structural change has yet been made that would weaken or sever the links among Islamic extremists and their regional hosts over a sustained period or enable greater cooperation between the United States or its allies with indigenous tribal populations. Accordingly, these regions continue to provide ideal locations for terrorist sanctuary, bases of support and operation, and freedom of movement. A supplemental U.S. policy option is required. The challenge thus becomes one of how to create more effective opportunities to gain influence and control over these select tribal regions while countering the influence of competitors over a sustained period. A policy of manipulating tribal fractures and rivalries to induce or heighten internal conflict could provide these opportunities. To this end, two case studies were selected and analyzed. The first case study describes European colonial and commercial efforts in North America from the early 16th century through the end of the Seven Years War in 1763. The author evaluates both the French and British entry into the Continent and their commensurate rivalry and attempts at regional hegemony using native tribes. The second case study details the British experience in the Northwest Frontier of the Indian Subcontinent and the deliberate recruitment of Pashtun tribesmen, beginning in late 1846, during the period of the so-called close-border policy, and their use as irregular and paramilitary forces throughout the region.