Cooperative Threat Reduction for a New Era

The Nunn Lugar program directly addresses the gravest danger the nation faces nuclear-armed terrorists. If terrorist organizations were to acquire HEU in sufficient quantity, and had the technical expertise, it would not be difficult for them to build a primitive, but deadly, nuclear device. The first priority of the United States and its upstream homeland security efforts must be to prevent that from happening. Up to two-thirds of Russias weapons-grade material remains inadequately secured. According to the DOE, at the end of Fiscal Year FY 2003, comprehensive security upgrades had been completed on only 22 percent of the estimated 600 metric tons of estimated nuclear-weapons-usable material in Russia. Rapid security upgrades had been put in place on only 42 percent of this material. While U.S. and NATO forces in Europe are being restructured, it may be an opportune time for the United States and Russia to take up the issue of control over tactical nuclear weapons. Although it is essential that existing materials be secured, attention must also be paid to facilities capable of producing more weapons-grade materials in the future. Three nuclear reactors in Russia currently produce approximately 1.2 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium each year. The purpose of this study is to review the techniques developed and used by the Nunn Lugar program to date, including some closely related activities, and to recommend specific ways in which these techniques could be applied on a global basis to eliminate the various types of nuclear threats faced by the United States. Expanding the scope of the Nunn Lugar CTR program beyond Russia should not jeopardize the political support for funding CTR. Rather, as a recent Carnegie Endowment report has emphasized, nuclear proliferation has become a global problem. Thus, the United States should be willing to take the lead in managing an expanded CTR initiative at the same time it encourages participation by other nations.