AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT: An Arrow Best Left in the Operational Commander's Quiver

Naval superiority in the amphibious operating area is a fundamental prerequisite for amphibious assault. The U.S. Navy can no longer realistically expect to wrest such naval superiority from many of its potential foes. Todays Navy must be prepared to dominate multiple, distant theaters while adversaries need only defend their own backyards. U.S. forces must dominate the littoral battlespace, while the enemy may only need to disrupt, delay or demoralize to succeed. This asymmetric nature of littoral warfare undermines the expectation that todays naval forces can achieve naval superiority in the face of the modern, multidimensional coastal defenses of potential adversaries such as North Korea or China. Todays naval leadership is shaping the Navy after Next to dominate the littoral battlespace of the year 2030. However, the threat that anti-ship missiles and submarines pose to todays amphibious task force has not received adequate scrutiny. As a result, todays naval forces are not training the way they will fight. Amphibious exercises do not realistically acknowledge the submarine and missile threats. During most exercises these threats are notional at best, and often simply assumed away. The assumption that the submarine and missile threats will be completely eliminated prior to an amphibious assault is no longer reasonable. Todays operational commander should therefore table contingency plans that rely upon an opposed amphibious assault. Table them until we begin to train, game and exercise the way we will be forced to fight. Table them until the ability to achieve naval superiority in the amphibious operating area is explicitly demonstrated-not implicitly assumed.