No More Bad Force Myths: A Tactical Study of Regimental Combat in Korea, July 1950

The purpose of this monograph is to inquire whether or not the traditional explanation of poor peacetime training and unit readiness is adequate to account for U.S. Army defeats during the first month of the Korean War. General histories of the war, such as those written by Roy Appleman, Clay Blair, and T.R. Fehrenbach, identify poor physical conditioning, lack of combat training, low strength and weak small unit leadership as prevalent in all U.S. Army units. The post-1945 drawdown is identified as the root cause of these shortcomings. The Armys equipment was old and worn and its soldiers were undertrained, understrength, ill- equipped. This paper will focus on what happened to the regiments in two of the Eighth Armys three divisions. It will consider the performance of all three of the 24th Infantry Divisions regiments between 5-20 July, or from Task Force Smiths first encounter north of Osan to the brutal stand at Taejon. It is this period in particular that historians have identified the materiel, personnel and training weaknesses as being critical, and have, by extrapolation, extended their importance to other units.