Surprise Attack. The Case of the Yom-Kippur War.

reportActive / Technical Report | Accession Number: ADA314675 | Open PDF

Abstract:

The issue of strategic surprise and specially the subject of surprise attack are some of the most complex problems that policymakers, militaries and intelligence analysts have to face. This is particularly true for states such as Israel, as it was demonstrated during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Israel was taken by surprise which effected the beginning of the war, as well as the final results. From the Israeli perspective the basic problem was rooted in the imbalance between the size of the Arab and the Israeli military and the asymmetry seen from a geographical perspective. The tDF Israeli defense forces is primarily based on reserve forces, whereas the Arab militaries are mainly active. Therefor the deployment of the Israeli reserves depends on early warning, a decision of mobilization and its execution. Moreover, Israel has no strategic depth and its vital objectives are very close to the borders. These factors indicate the significance of the surprise attack and the need for intelligence warning, as a fundamental issue in the national security doctrine.

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