Calculating the Utility of Attacks Against Ballistic Missile Transporter-Erector-Launchers

Under the assumption that future opponents will choose to acquire inventories of theater ballistic missiles TBMs substantially larger than the number of their transporter-erector-launchers TELs, this report supports the view that counterforce operations against the TELs can play a role in sharply reducing the overall size of a prospective threat. For initial inventory ratios of 10 TBMs per TEL a ratio not inconsistent with past practice by many countries, reductions of approximately 80 percent in missiles launched are possible with probabilities of successful postlaunch TEL kill of about 0.5. Even for probabilities of TEL kill of only 0.2, reductions of 50 percent are possible. Combined prelaunch and postlaunch counterforce attacks act synergistically, enhancing the overall effectiveness. The report does not discuss the circumstances in which these attacks can achieve any specific degree of effectiveness. History suggests that claims for significant counterforce capabilities should be viewed with skepticism. While we concur with this observation, there may exist a significant motivation for striving to make this capability at least modestly effective. We believe that this is clearly possible for postlaunch counterbattery operations.