Non-Strategic Nuclear Targeting in a Non-Nuclear Army

This study investigates the ability of a U.S. Army corps staff to nominate appropriate non-strategic nuclear targets. The staff is investigated as to its manning, training, and equipment to nominate targets for Air Force and Navy delivered nuclear weapons that the Corps could exploit to accomplish operational objectives. All levels of joint and service specific doctrine are examined along with limited non-governmental resources to determine corps staff requirements and desirable corps staff qualities. The structure, training, and equipment of a corps staff are then examined to determine what each staff cell can contribute to nuclear planning. Finally, the staff is assessed as to its ability to meet the requirements determined earlier in the study. The study finds the corps staff to be marginally manned, trained, and equipped for non-strategic nuclear target nomination. The basic structure and operational capabilities of the staff are found to be sound. The principal deficiencies are found to be inadequate nuclear training throughout the officer education system and an unsatisfactory vision for nuclear operations in principal doctrinal manuals, such as FM 100-5. These leave the corps staff ill prepared to plan or execute operations that exploit nuclear effects. Nuclear targeting, Nonstrategic nuclear weapons, Nonstrategic nuclear forces, Nuclear weapons, Tactical nuclear weapons, Army Corps.