Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR): Time to Find a Real Fix

The history of Combat Search and Rescue CSAR has shown a severe lack of capability prior to hostilities followed by a massive effort in funding and acquisition of required resources to field an effective CSAR capability during combat operations. Since 1986 and the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD reorganization act, the United States military has been required, by law, to restructure the Services and to incorporate joint capabilities in all of the warfighting mission areas. Combat Search and Rescue has failed in their attempt to provide the warfare commander with a viable rescue capability. The new joint doctrine for CSAR maintains individual Service responsibility for conducting CSAR missions. This is one mission area where a joint effort is seriously lacking. By failing to address the mission and objectives to be attained, CSAR capability is severely degraded and does not support the operational commander. The underlying principles which govern unified action are flawed and there is no unity of effort, centralized direction or interoperability when it comes to CSAR. Duplication of effort and wasted manpower and resources have left the United States ill prepared to jointly and effectively implement the mission of Combat Search and Rescue. There is a solution that will reverse the trend and alleviate the problems that are associated with parochial service control which hampers the CSAR mission. This paper will discuss the history of Combat Search and Rescue, the current doctrine and capabilities provided the warfare commander, and alternative solutions to provide a real fix to this dilemma for the operational commander.