The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: History of an Illusion

The purpose of this paper is to examine the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force INF Treaty in historical perspective. The thesis of the paper is that the treaty is an illusion. It is an illusion that promotes the idea that security can be achieved exclusively through arms control, at the expense of balanced and diverse forces across the entire spectrum of deterrence. Although the treaty has been fully ratified, and U.S and Soviet Officials have begun the process of destroying launchers, debate still rages in NATO capitals over the treats impact on alliance security and cohesion. This paper begins with a discussion of the evolution of NATOs deterrent strategy. It continues with a chronology of events leading to the signing of the treaty by President Reagan and General Secretary Brobachev on December 8, 1987. The paper assesses the military and political impact of the treaty and ends with possible implications for NATOs future and recommendations for further arms control negotiations. The paper concludes that the treaty has not achieved what its supporters claim. In fact the treaty is an arms control agreement that 1 is not remotely related to its original purpose 2 has reinforced NATO military inferiority and 3 may have laid the groundwork for the unraveling of th Atlantic Alliance.