The Conduct of Continuous Operations,

Success in modern warfare is no longer the product of a single decisive battle, rather, success is the result of decisive campaign. The great campaigns of World War II all ended prior to the conclusion of the war because the armies involved were unable to conduct continuous combat operations -operations that concluded only with the decisive defeat of the enemy. This monograph operations and compares the theory to the experience of the Third U.S. Armys attack across France in August of 1944. The paper begins with an examination of modern military theory and doctrine on continuous operations. The body of available theory readily supports a doctrine of continuous combat and supports the use of continuous combat as a means of decisively defeating an enemy. Analysis of Third Armys August, 1944 offensive, that took Third Army from Avranches to Verdun confirms the efficacy of the theory, and offers additional insight into the conduct of continuous combat. The paper concludes with observations on the key factors in the conduct of continuous operations.