Chinese Communist Intervention in the Korean War: Miscalculation or Provocation?

This study is an historical analysis of the Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War from the perspective of the intelligence available to General Douglas MacArthur prior to the Chinese Communist counteroffensive. It answers whether MacArthur should have known his drive toward the Yalu River would provoke the Chinese Communists overt military intervention in the Korean War on 25 November 1950. This thesis considers the significant, credible intelligence available to the various levels of the US military and national intelligence and the resulting estimates of Chinese Communist intent significantly affected the national and military policy makers. The evidence is presented chronologically and is considered on three levels strategic intelligence, operational intelligence, and tactical intelligence. Strategic intelligence emanated from international and diplomatic sources. Operational intelligence was obtained in the Far East, particularly the Peoples Republic of China, but not within the boundaries of either North or South Korea. Tactical or battlefield intelligence was the confirmation or repudiation of analyses derived from strategic and operational intelligence.