Military Strategy in the Battle of Britain: A Crowlian Analysis

The author uses an analysis technique proposed by Philip a. Crowl to analyze the military strategy of the Battle of Britain. Crowls method involves evaluating a series of questions intended to be asked by strategists as they plan for future wars. After sketching the background of the battle, the author examines the objective of the campaign from both sides and evaluates whether the military strategies were tailored to meet the respective national political objectives. Next the limits of military power are detailed followed by an evaluation of the military alternatives. The analysis concludes with a detailed discussion of public support for the battle and an opinion on whether or not too many parallels were drawn with past successes, while military failures were overlooked in planning process. The author concludes that Germany lost the Battle of Britain primarily because she had no clearly defend objective, failed to recognize the limits of her military power, and lacked a carefully planned alternate course of action. The paper closes with a discussion of current US military strategy and compares our current philosophy with Crowls questions. It appears that current US strategy has not overlooked the lessons learned from historys first significant air battle.