The Unified Command System and Unity of Command,

This study examines the ability of the current Unified Command System to provide unity of command and thereby obtain unity of effort in multi-service operations. Two historical case studies are developed -- Desert One Grenada-- with the intent of determining the degree of adherence to the dictates of the current system and the unity of effort obtained. In both cases a departure from the existing system was evidenced. OPSEC played a critical part in detracting from the unity of effort obtainable, largely because of the compartmentalization in planning. Additionally, ad hoc command and control and staffing arrangements evident in both cases may have been motivated by service rivalry andor political concessions. While existing doctrine appears adequate, there is evidence of service resistance towards integration. This is characterized by the lack of authority allows for only a loose confederation of single service resistance towards integration. This is characterized by the lack of authority generally provided to unifying entities. The resultant imbalance between responsibility and authority allows for only a loose confederation of single service forces. Service parochialism appears to emanate largely from a lack of mutual confidence and trust, and a general dearth of joint expertise. The author provides recommendations to overcome this resistance.