Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence,

According to the scenarios imagined by most strategists, nuclear confrontation is a game involving a trade-off between two values. First, there is the value associated with the immediate issue of contention e.g., in the Cuban missile crisis, maintaining U.S. prestige in the world arena in the Berlin crisis, maintaining the credibility of U.S. commitments. Second, there is the value of minimizing the possibility that an unwanted general war could result from this superpower confrontation. A trade-off relationship exists between these two values. That is, assuming a strong commitment on the part of both adversaries, any policy which tries to attain the value associated with the immediate point of contention will tend to increase the likelihood of general war. Conversely, any policy which seeks to maximize the avoidance of war will jeopardize the protection of the other value.