The Communist Army of Greece, 1947-1949: A Study of Its Failure

This research project is designed to examine the empirical evidence available to date concerning the reasons for the defeat of the Communist Army of Greece in 1949. This work is the result of this authors endeavor to understand and evaluate why the Communist Insurgency failed in Greece. This failure is specifically addressed herein to determine whether the Communist defeat was the result of military action or political turmoil within the Communist Party of Greece. In order to answer this question, the study provides an historical interpretation of all the significant events during the existence of the Party from 1919 to 1949. Investigation reveals that the Greek Communist Party strategically lost the war when the Central Committee reintroduced the question of the creation of an independent Macedonia as part of the Partys objectives. On the military side of the problem, the decision by the Communists to switch from subconventional to conventional warfare was the most serious mistake made. This change of policy was predicated on the existence of a large popular base from which to operate. This study demonstrates that there was no large popular base.