Operation Cobra: Organizational Pooling and Operational Art in the European Theater

Many historians consider Operation Cobra, the breakout from Normandy at the end of July 1944, one of the most successful armored penetrations conducted on the Western Front during World War II. Some, however, give little credit to the infantry divisions that made up a majority of the forces involved. Limited by the requirement to ship all of its forces overseas, the War Department, and particularly the Army Ground Forces, adhered to principles that kept the size of American divisions relatively small, particularly the infantry divisions. Those decisions focused on efficiency but had an impact on combat effectiveness, which became readily apparent during the first few weeks of fighting in Normandy. Both veteran and green divisions alike struggled to apply and modify their doctrine and training to overcome the stalemate that was costing hundreds of casualties daily. By mid-July 1944, the Allies were in dire need of breaking into the open terrain of central France, where they could benefit from their advantage in mechanized mobility. Operation Cobra, a penetration of six experienced divisions on a narrow front, was General Omar Bradleys plan to break out with the US First Army. Bradley gave his forces the initial objective of encircling a portion of the German Seventh Army along its western flank, after which they would clear a route for Pattons newly arriving Third Army into Brittany, to seize the vital coastal ports there. Thanks to an audacious concentrated air bombardment and the combined arms cooperation in US VII Corps infantry divisions, Cobra achieved tremendous success, creating additional opportunities beyond the objective to clear Brittany of Germans. Within two weeks of the operation, senior Allied leaders shifted their focus from securing ports to aggressively pursuing a disorganized and defeated German Army.