SIGINT, EW, and EIW in the Korean People's Army: An Overview of Development and Organization

For many years now the leaders of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Ministry of Peoples Armed Forces, and the Korean Peoples Army have understood the importance of C4ISR and, more specifically, signals intelligence and electronic warfare. Electronic warfare is understood by the MPAF to consist of operations using the electromagnetic spectrum to attack e.g., jamming, spoofing, etc. the enemy. During the 1990s the MPAF identified electronic intelligence warfare China Chinungjon, EIW as a new type of warfare, the essence of which is the disruption or destruction of the opponents computer networks -- thus paralyzing the enemys military command and control system. Although this appears to be analogous to information warfare the MPAFs understanding may also include elements of reconnaissance, cryptanalysis, intelligence collection, and disinformation operations, as well as the use of the Internet to cause disruption within the enemys social and economic homeland. It would appear that EW and SIGINT operations are conducted at all levels of the MPAF and intelligence community. While EIW operations are conducted at the national level e.g., General Staff Department, Reconnaissance Bureau, State Security Department, etc.. The MPAF believes that EW and EIW are complimentary and that they must be integrated with conventional forces and operations to be effective on the modern battlefield,97 Do not prepare for electronic warfare just because that is what others are doing. In modern warfare, modern and conventional weapons must be massed and combined. Kim Jong Il98 Details concerning how the MPAF developed this understanding, and how it has organized and planned to conduct SIGINT, EW and EIW operations, are extremely limited. What follows, albeit somewhat disjointed and certainly incomplete, provides an unclassified overview of the subject.