A THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY

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Abstract:

In this paper an attempt is made to describe a theory of bureaucratic decisionmaking aimed at achieving predictability. The theory is based upon the fundamental hypothesis that bureaucratic officials, like all other agents in society, are motivated by their own self interests at least part of the time. Therefore, this theory follows the tradition of economic thought from Adam Smith forward, and is consistent with recent contributions to political science made by such writers as Simmel, Truman, Schattschneider, Buchanan, Tullock, Riker, Simon, and March.

Author(s):
Downs, Anthony
Author Organization(s):
RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA
Pagination:
0014

Security Markings

DOCUMENT & CONTEXTUAL SUMMARY

Distribution:
Approved For Public Release
Distribution Statement:
Approved For Public Release; Distribution Is Unlimited.

RECORD

Collection: TR
Identifying Numbers
Report Number(s):
RAND-P-3031
Monitor Series:
XD
 Subject Terms
Joint Capability Areas:
JCA_5_Command and Control; JCA_5.3_Planning; JCA_5.5.1_Communicate Intent and Guidance; JCA_5.5_Direct; JCA_1_Force Support; JCA_1.3_Human Capital Management; JCA_5.3.3_Develop Strategy; JCA_5.3.4_Develop Courses of Action; JCA_5.3.5_Analyze Courses of Action; JCA_5.4_Decide; JCA_6.4.1_Secure Information Exchange; JCA_1.2_Force Preparation; JCA_6_Net Centric; JCA_1.3.2_Personnel Management; JCA_1.2.3_Educating; JCA_6.4_Information Assurance
Communities of Interest:
Human Systems
Descriptor(s):
*DECISION MAKING, *GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, POLITICAL SCIENCE, LEADERSHIP, ECONOMICS, PERFORMANCE(HUMAN), PERSONNEL, HIERARCHIES
Field(s)/Group(s):
Government and Political Science
Keyword(s):
BUREAUCRACIES
Report Date:
1964 Nov 01