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Accession Number:

AD1132461

Title:

A CYBER THREAT TAXONOMY AND A VIABILITY ANALYSIS FOR FALSE INJECTIONS IN THE TRAFFIC COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM (TCAS)

Author(s):

• Hannah, John W

Author Organization(s):

• AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH

Report Date:

2021-03-25

Abstract:

This thesis provided background information on the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). Additionally, the thesis developed a threat taxonomy for TCAS, resulting in the determination that a false injection attack presents the most comprehensive risk. Moreover, the thesis presents the development of a program to determine what ranges, altitudes, and relative bearings are most vulnerable to a false injection attack. The program includes test for all requirements of a successful false injection. Furthermore, the thesis presents an analysis of results and creates threat maps as situational awareness tools. Lastly, the thesis discusses potential solutions to the false injection attack, covers future work in the areas of TCAS vulnerabilities, and concludes the thesis.

Document Type:

Conference:

Journal:

Pages:

94

File Size:

6.35MB

Contracts:

Grants:

Descriptors:

• radar
• air force
• airborne collision avoidance systems
• traffic collision avoidance system
• collision avoidance
• collision avoidance systems
• cyberattacks
• denial of service attack
• aircrafts
• cyber threats
• civil aviation
• electronic jamming
• engineering
• flight paths
• control panels
• eavesdropping
• flight speeds
• radio transmitters
• security
• simulations

Identifiers:

• TCAS (TRAFFIC COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM)
• False Injection
• Threat Maps
• CYBER THREAT TAXONOMY
• tcas vulnerabilities
• mode s

SubjectCategory:

• Aviation Technology
• Mathematical and Computer Sciences

Communities of Interest:

• Air Platforms

Distribution Statement:

Approved For Public Release

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