Logistics Information Systems have enabled the Australian Army's supply chains, maintenance, transportation and distribution systems to become lean, responsive and efficient. However, these systems are reliant on a permissive cyberspace environment. Not only are the Australian Army's logistics information systems reliant on cyberspace to support forces in the physical domains but they routinely share information with third-party contractors, civilian and commercial vendors to generate the required effects. These interactions between information systems increase the vulnerability of military logistics information systems operating within cyberspace. Cyberspace has provided adversaries with a different method of targeting logistics, one that can be achieved by state and non-state actors with relatively low costs. Academic literature identifies opportunities and threats presented by the cyberspace domain but does not articulate the vulnerabilities of Logistics Information Systems operating in cyberspace. There is relatively little academic literature identifying what measures should be taken to protect Logistics Information Systems in cyberspace. Australian Army logistics doctrine focuses almost exclusively on the benefits gained through integrated networks without detailed risk mitigation focused on maintaining the confidentiality, integrity, and access to military Logistics Information Systems while developing resilience and redundancy to mitigate against network compromise.