ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
This monograph analyzes the ability of U.S. Army engineers to organize at the division level and support tactical offensive operations on the contemporary battlefield. The analysis is conducted in light of the Soviet experience in organizing for maneuver-oriented offensive operations. The study first examines the nature of tactical mobility and its implications for conducting maneuver warfare. This section concludes that mobility is not a function of one arm within a combined arms force. Rather, mobility is an effect of several elements. The organizational element of mobility is influenced by tactical unity. Tactical unity and the role of the engineer on the combined arms team are then established as the focus for the study. A review of Soviet engineer organizations from an historical and doctrinal perspective then reveals the source of their strength -- specialization, flexibility, standardization of combined arms elements according to function within offensive operations, and an all-arms approach to the problem of mobility. This section focuses on the Soviet experience with such tactical organizations as the mobile obstacle detachment, movement support detachment, engineer reconnaissance patrol and the obstacle clearing detachment. The monograph then assesses the U.S. Armys mobility operations.