ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES
This monograph discusses how well U.S. Army doctrine exploits the development of weapons. With the rapid ongoing modernization of our forces, it is imperative that the army make the most out of new technology. The premise is that current U.S. Army doctrine and tactical writings fail to make the maximum use of weapons that have been developed. The methodology used to defend this premise begins with an introduction to the problem and definitions. An historical review of the Spencer rifle, chemical weapons in WWI and the Sheridan tank illustrate the problem. Next, the Bradley technological development and doctrine is examined. The monograph ends with an analysis of what effect the lack of doctrine has had on the Bradley and recommends a method to ensure that weapons and doctrine complement each other. Keywords Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle Tactics, Technology.