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Evolving Military Intelligence: The Effect of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and the Military Intelligence Organization (MIO) During the Korean and Vietnam Wars

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US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth United States

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This study focuses on the development of the Military Intelligence Service MIS and the Military Intelligence Organization MIO. It addresses the need for leaders to understand why military intelligence units developed. It argues that the U.S. Army implemented MIO too quickly, that it was not properly tested and may not have been a viable unit structure in a future war, though it was effective in the Vietnam War. MIS on the other hand, predicated on small cellular teams that can deploy flexibly and quickly, was developed based on World War II structures and recommendations of G-2s during that war. Brigadier General Thomas F. MIO manning and doctrine, published in 1956, established the military intelligence organizations that deployed into Vietnam a decade later. However, the Army never fully implemented MIO due to personnel and budget cuts. Units organized under MIS and MIO, aided by the slow build-up and the primacy given to intelligence collection during the initial stages of the conflict, performed well during the Vietnam War. While MIS and MIO were successful in Vietnam, there are still deficiencies leaders must consider when utilizing the organizations or during future changes of how military intelligence supports tactical combat commanders.

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Technical Report



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Approved For Public Release;

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