US Army School for Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth United States
Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan GIRoA, the United States, the United Nations, and the International Security Assistance Force ISAF have funded and led four different Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration DDR programs. Despite a significant investment in time and treasure, all of them have failed to significantly reduce the number of insurgents or arbaki militia. This monograph seeks to answer why these programs failed despite incorporating ideas from the prominent DDR schools of thought. Utilizing Stathis Kalyvas theory of The Logic of Violence in Civil War as a lens, this monograph argues that GIRoA and ISAF did not have sufficient control of territory to entice insurgents or arbaki to reconcile andor reintegrate with the government. Further, in areas GIRoA nominally controlled in northern and western Afghanistan, regional powerbrokers who actually controlled these areas balked at these programs. Based on this analysis, this monograph recommends that in the future DDR programs should be incorporated into Phase IV planning, and when implemented by international organizations the Department of Defense should fully support them.