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STRATEGIC SURPRISE IN THE KOREAN WAR
RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA
Three assumptions seem to have developed after Pearl Harbor about intelligence problems relating to surprise attack. One is that if intelligence teams collect everything, they will be reasonably sure not to miss key intelligence items. The second is that improved coordination between organizations and a wider sharing of intelligence data between individuals and organizations will help safeguard the United States against surprise. The third belief is that because the U. S. needs to have strategic warning in order to survive in the age of nuclear plenty, it will somehow get this warning and will make the necessary responses. The purpose of the paper is to urge a review of these assumptions in the light of the Korean war experience of the United States. It calls attention to the importance of the prevailing climate of military-political opinion in the evaluation of intelligence materials.
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.