Mobilization Studies Program Report. The Ability of the Industrial Base to Mobilize--Historical Lessons Applied to Contemporary Policies and Organization.
INDUSTRIAL COLL OF THE ARMED FORCES WASHINGTON DC
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This paper identifies those major industrial mobilization lessons from World War II and the early 1950s and contrasts those lessons with current policies and organizations to plan and execute industrial mobilization to support a conventional war of indeterminate length and intensity. FindingsConclusions are Industrial mobilization does not represent a viable component of national security. 1 The multiplicity of statutory requirements, authorities, and prohibitions is overwhelming, causing serious ambiguity regarding the sufficiency of existing authority and generating confusion regarding responsibilities. This seriously decrements our ability to plan and, if required, manage an industrial mobilization. 2 Current organizations do not have clearly defined responsibilities, are not adequately resourced, and do not have the ability to transition from peacetime planning to wartime execution. 3 No clearly defined mobilization plan or comprehensive planning process exists. Recommendations are 1 Creation of omnibus legislation--or, at a minimum, improved cross indexing of existing mobilization authority--would assure the sufficiency of mobilization authority, improve the assignment of responsibility, and facilitate the transition, from peacetime planning to wartime execution. 2 Single agency control of the industrial base mobilization process would enhance management control of mobilization planning and management, and could lead to adequate resourcing of this vital Government function.
- Administration and Management