A System for Humanitarian Intervention?
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
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This monograph investigates the reasons for the lack of coordination and combined effort between political leadership, military engagement and humanitarian activity during a humanitarian intervention. It analyses basic principles to successfully combine these aspects in a system for these type of operations. The peace operation in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 is used an example and analytical framework. The monograph first describes the changed nature of conflicts with the end of the Cold War and defines intra state conflicts, which result in failed states, as happened in Somalia, as the most likely type of conflict for the foreseeable future. After a brief description of the nature of humanitarian intervention as a new type of peace operation in a post-Cold War environment and the anatomy of a failed state the focus is on analyzing the political-, military-, and humanitarian key actors criteria for action and success in humanitarian interventions. The monograph discusses the reasons for failure in humanitarian interventions like Somalia as a combination of the key actors still Cold War dominated event-or situation oriented view instead of a process-oriented view necessary to create a New World Order and not adjusted criteria for action and success in a new crises environment. The basis for the lack of political, military and humanitarian cooperation is the missing combined systematic approach for conflict resolution. The study concludes in defining three basic principles- the acceptance of humanitarian intervention as a process, the necessary shift from a force-oriented to a time-oriented approach, and the application of a dynamic combined strategy- for a system to successfully combine the political, military and humanitarian dimensions of a humanitarian intervention.
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics