The Marshall Plan as Strategic Analogy: Implications for Post-Conflict Reconstruction Planning
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
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This monograph examines the use of the Marshall Plan as a strategic analogy for successful post-conflict success. It details what the Marshall Plan really was, what it accomplished, and how it did so in post-World War II Western Europe. In doing so, this research extracts five contextual variables that contributed to the Marshall Plans success in Western Europe and applies them to recent post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan to determine the utility of the Marshall Plan as a strategic analogy for post-conflict success. This monograph concludes that the Marshall Plan analogy has been poorly applied creating troubling implications for phases IV Stabilize and V Enable Civil Authority operational planners. Planners must recognize the use of strategic analogy, understand its potential implications when used as a form of strategic guidance, see through analogy to seek the best understanding possible of the context they face, and develop a solution to future post-conflict operations that accounts for such context.
- Government and Political Science
- Humanities and History