Accession Number:

ADA611958

Title:

Transitioning to Occupation and Liberation: What Went Right in World War II and Wrong in Iraq

Descriptive Note:

Master's thesis

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2014-05-22

Pagination or Media Count:

64.0

Abstract:

The occupation of Germany after World War II and the liberation of Iraq resulting from Operation Iraqi Freedom were two entirely different approaches to ending each conflict. The Army during World War II benefitted from several years of extensive whole of government planning and preparation for the transition from combat operations to military occupation in the European Theater. In approaching Iraq, political and military leaders neither prepared the policies nor provided the resources necessary to achieve the strategic objective. Additionally, the U.S. government and U.S. Central Command incorrectly framed the operation as a liberation. The liberation approach constrained the Armys ability to control the environment, ultimately ceding the initiative gained through the invasion. The dissonance between the strategic objective and the strategic and operational planning and resourcing contributed to the early failures of the Armys transition to stability operations. The utility of comparing lessons from both conflicts is in the development of relevant recommendations for future military, and specifically Army planning and preparation for transitions from offensive operations to stability operations. Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed both the associated complexity and critical importance of planning for the transition from offensive to stabilization operations. U.S. Central Command primarily focused on planning and preparations for combat, and was ill prepared to transition to stability operations. Why were World War II civil affairs and military government operations in Germany successful and initial stability operations in Iraq not Analysis of this question includes evaluations of U.S. national and strategic policy, military planning and resourcing, and Army doctrine from the time of each campaign.

Subject Categories:

  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE