Accession Number:

ADA605433

Title:

Could the Outcome of the Genocide in Rwanda be Different with an Operational Planning Cell in the United Nations?

Descriptive Note:

Monograph

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2012-06-08

Pagination or Media Count:

49.0

Abstract:

Viewing the genocide in Rwanda as a case study, the monograph asks whether an operational planning cell could have provided appropriate tactical direction and strategic-level guidance to the UN decisions-makers. The document provides a synopsis of Rwandas historical violence and examines how the UN was structured to do operational planning at the time of the Rwanda mission. It concludes by arguing that the UNs inability to link the strategic intent to tactical actions because of the absence of an operational planning capacity resulted in the UN leaders moving forward with an inaccurate set of assumptions. Having an operational planning cell would likely have changed the ultimate outcome in Rwanda. In addressing the above, the paper examines the related issues of the UN operating mandate and rules of engagement ROE. Finally, it explores why the UN deliberately ignored the situation in Rwanda until it had deteriorated to a point where DPKO action was unable to make a difference to the outcome of the genocide.

Subject Categories:

  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE