Accession Number:

ADA592725

Title:

Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

CORNELL UNIV ITHACA NY DEPT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE

Report Date:

2012-03-23

Pagination or Media Count:

32.0

Abstract:

We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multi-dimensional preferences over several possible configurations of the good furthermore, it allows an agents budget and risk preference to be known only privately to the agent. These are the main challenge areas for auction theory. A single-agent problem is to optimize a given objective subject to a constraint on the maximum probability with which each type is allocated, a.k.a., an allocation rule. Our approach is a reduction from multi-agent mechanism design problem to collection of single-agent problems. We focus on maximizing revenue, but our results can be applied to other objectives e.g., welfare.

Subject Categories:

  • Computer Systems

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE