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Accession Number:
ADA587236
Title:
Learning From Iraq: A Final Report From the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Descriptive Note:
Final rept.
Corporate Author:
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ARLINGTON VA
Report Date:
2013-03-01
Pagination or Media Count:
187.0
Abstract:
When SIGIR began work in early 2004 as the Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General, it was the only inspector general office within the U.S. government possessing oversight responsibilities encompassing several federal agencies. Over time, the Congress expanded SIGIR s mission so that, by 2008, its mandate required reporting on all reconstruction funds regardless of provenance. During most of its nine-year lifespan, SIGIR maintained the largest on-the-ground presence of any U.S. auditing or investigative agency operating in Iraq. In 2008, the number of SIGIR personnel in country exceeded 50. Three operational directorates accomplished the oversight work Audits, Inspections, and Investigations. They had these common objectives -to deter the misuse of taxpayer dollars through the prevention and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse -to promote improved economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the Iraq reconstruction program The Iraq reconstruction program provided a plethora of lessons about what happens when stabilization and reconstruction operations commence without sufficient systemic support in place. Among the most salient is the need to provide a robust in-country team of auditors, inspectors, and investigators from the operation s outset. A substantial IG presence will deter or detect fraud, waste, and abuse, improving mission efficiency and effectiveness. Fraud is the intentional wrongdoing by persons seeking to enrich themselves. Waste is the product of poor planning and weak controls. Abuse is bad management. The absence of a strong oversight force early in the Iraq program allowed too much of each to occur.
Distribution Statement:
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
