Accession Number:

ADA583823

Title:

Combining Concepts: Operational Shock in Insurgencies

Descriptive Note:

Monograph

Corporate Author:

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2013-05-23

Pagination or Media Count:

69.0

Abstract:

The focus of this work is to determine whether the concept of operational shock, which has served as the intellectual underpinning of the U.S. Armys doctrine over the past 30 years, can be used to guide an operational approach in a counterinsurgency campaign. The American way of war now focuses not on the destruction of an enemys equipment and personnel, but on degrading and disrupting his ability to continue to fight. Much of counterinsurgency doctrine and theory does not fit this operational logic. The previous decade of war has led to a renewed debate both in public and inside the national security apparatus of the United States. With the publication of Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, the United States produced its first doctrine dedicated to countering insurgency in over 20 years. The logic within FM 3-24 dictates that if the counterinsurgent can dissolve the conditions that enabled the existence of the insurgency, governmental forces can change the logic of the population. The monograph posits that to effectively set conditions to affect the logic of the population, the counterinsurgent must affect the logic of the insurgency it is opposing. The intent is neither to prove nor disprove either the enemy-centric or population-centric models of counterinsurgency, but instead to argue that there must be a balance of both approaches. There may be a time during a counterinsurgency campaign in which the disruption of the insurgencys logic, and causing a fractionalization within the enemy system should be the focus of the counterinsurgents operations. The monograph examines the theoretical basis for both operational and counterinsurgent doctrine. It then combines these two concepts to provide a theoretical model of an insurgency in a state of shock. Two historical case studies are presented in which the counterinsurgent force, using different force structures and capabilities, were able to effectively shock the systems of the insurgencies they opposed.

Subject Categories:

  • Humanities and History
  • Military Forces and Organizations
  • Unconventional Warfare

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE