Accession Number:

ADA581956

Title:

Third-Party Opportunism and the (In)Efficiency of Public Contracts

Descriptive Note:

Conference paper

Corporate Author:

CALIFORNIA UNIV BERKELEY HAAS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

Report Date:

2012-07-29

Pagination or Media Count:

67.0

Abstract:

The lack of exibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties--political opponents, competitors, interest groups--while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. Reduced exibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenge lowering third parties expected gains and increasing litigation costs. We provide a comprehensible theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions.

Subject Categories:

  • Administration and Management
  • Government and Political Science
  • Logistics, Military Facilities and Supplies

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE