Accession Number:

ADA569924

Title:

NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture After the Chicago Summit

Descriptive Note:

Workshop rept.

Corporate Author:

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA DEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2012-11-01

Pagination or Media Count:

39.0

Abstract:

On 25-27 June 2012 the NATO Defense College, the NATO Nuclear Policy Directorate, and the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict convened a workshop at the NATO Defense College in Rome concerning the future of NATOs deterrence and defense posture in light of the decisions made at the Alliances summit meeting in Chicago in May 2012. Much of the discussion focused on the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review DDPR approved by the Allies at the Chicago Summit. Some workshop participants expressed reservations about a fundamental premise of the DDPR -- that the Allies should define an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities. Some participants argued that missile defense is burdened by questions about its effectiveness and cost, while conventional deterrence is threatened by cutbacks in defense spending in the current and potentially long-lasting financial crisis. In this situation, the Allies will be faced with the choice of continuing to rely on nuclear deterrence or seeing deterrence undermined. Many workshop participants said that NATOs nuclear-sharing arrangements remain important for deterrence and assurance within the Alliance. The life extension program for the B-61 gravity bomb and the modernization of dual-capable aircraft remain central issues for the future of NATOs nuclear deterrence posture. Several participants said that the DDPRs focus on nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities was too narrow and that future assessments of the Alliances capability requirements must take the cyber and space dimensions into account. Participants agreed that strategic communication is essential for credibility and effective deterrence and crisis management, and some participants analyzed how messages may be misinterpreted by potential adversaries. Several participants identified obstacles to negotiating limits on Russian nonstrategic nuclear forces.

Subject Categories:

  • Government and Political Science
  • Military Forces and Organizations
  • Defense Systems
  • Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE