Accession Number:

ADA550584

Title:

Exploitation of Unintentional Information Leakage from Integrated Circuits

Descriptive Note:

Doctoral thesis

Corporate Author:

AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT

Personal Author(s):

Report Date:

2011-12-01

Pagination or Media Count:

220.0

Abstract:

Unintentional electromagnetic emissions are used to recognize or verify the identity of a unique integrated circuit IC based on fabrication process-induced variations in a manner analogous to biometric human identification. The effectiveness of the technique is demonstrated through an extensive empirical study, with results presented indicating correct device identification success rates of greater than 995, and average verification equal error rates EERs of less than 005 for 40 near-identical devices. The proposed approach is suitable for security applications involving commodity commercial ICs, with substantial cost and scalability advantages over existing approaches. A systematic leakage mapping methodology is also proposed to comprehensively assess the information leakage of arbitrary block cipher implementations, and to quantitatively bound an arbitrary implementations resistance to the general class of differential side channel analysis techniques. The framework is demonstrated using the well-known Hamming Weight and Hamming Distance leakage models, and approachs effectiveness is demonstrated through the empirical assessment of two typical unprotected implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard. The assessment results are empirically validated against correlation-based differential power and electromagnetic analysis attacks.

Subject Categories:

  • Information Science
  • Cybernetics
  • Defense Systems

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE