Improving CIA Analytic Performance: DI Analytic Priorities
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON DC
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A host of reports have been written over the 50 years of CIA history evaluating analytic performance and recommending changes in priorities and tradecraft. These post-mortem reports have been issued by Agency leaders and components as well as by Congressional committees and commissions and non-governmental organizations concerned about intelligence performance. Starting with the 1990s, post-mortem reports increased in number, generated both by charges of specific intelligence failures and by general recognition that the post-Cold War period presented new challenges to intelligence. The recent post-mortem reports have helped Directorate of Intelligence leaders to examine current doctrine and practice critically, and to address identified challenges in training programs. This Occasional Paper is one of a series of assessments of what recent critiques have said about the key challenges facing the DI in the new century. The present paper addresses the challenge of establishing priorities among competing uses of analytic resources for example, current trend reporting vs. customized action analysis vs. in-depth studies. It reviews six post-mortem critiques 1 Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of Intelligence, In from the Cold 1996 2 Adm. David Jeremiah R, Intelligence Communitys Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests 1998 3 Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States 1998 4 Independent Task force of the Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter The Future of U.S. Intelligence 1996 5 Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st Century An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence 1996 6 Staff Study, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, IC21 Intelligence Community in the 21st Century 1996.
- Military Intelligence