Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON DC
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A host of reports have been written over the 50 years of CIA history evaluating analytic performance and recommending changes in priorities and tradecraft. These post-mortem reports have been issued by Agency leaders and components as well as by Congressional committees and commissions and non-governmental organizations concerned about intelligence performance. Starting with the 1990s, post-mortem reports increased in number, generated both by charges of specific intelligence failures and by general recognition that the post-Cold War period presented new challenges to intelligence. The recent post-mortem reports have helped Directorate of Intelligence leaders to examine current doctrine and practice critically, and to address identified challenges in training programs. This Occasional Paper is one of a series of assessments of what recent critiques have said about the key challenges facing the DI in the new century. The present paper addresses the challenges of strategic warning. It reviews five post-mortem critiques 1 Douglas J. MacEachin, Tradecraft of Analysis, U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads Agendas for Reform 1995 2 Adm. David Jeremiah R, Intelligence Communitys Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests 1998 3 CIA, Office of Inspector General, Alternative Analysis in the Directorate of Intelligence 1999 4 Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States 1998 5 Working Group on Intelligence Reform of the National Strategy Information Center, The Future of US Intelligence 1996.
- Military Intelligence