Command and Control for Joint Strategic Actions
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC
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A decade after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and following a series of defense policy reviews, the most critical security question remains unanswered What kinds of forces, strategies, and resource commitments are needed for the future This is no accident. A 30 percent reduction in the defense budget since 1989 and a reluctance on the part of the services to adopt any plan that fails to reaffirm their traditional roles and force structures combine to obstruct meaningful change. In fact, the budget topline imposed by defense reviews and legislation has intensified interservice rivalry and prompted the senior military leadership to stress the validity of existing single-service doctrine, organization, and tactics. Thus the United States risks wasting the opportunity to make significant gains on rival militaries. A revolution in military affairs RMA will occur whether defense leaders encourage it or not. The choice is whether to be the beneficiary or victim. Such a revolution is evidenced in potential enemies - nations, failed states, and subnational groups -dispossessed by modernization and each trying to acquire capabilities to strike decisively with weapons of mass destruction WMD. Strategists must assume that future adversaries will possess not only some form of WMD but precision-guided munitions along with electronic intelligence and satellite imagery provided by third powers.
- Military Forces and Organizations
- Defense Systems
- Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics