Command and Control of Airpower in Irregular Warfare
ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
Pagination or Media Count:
The Luftwaffes defeat of Allied airpower in the Kasserine Pass in 1943 imprinted the principle of mass upon the U.S. Air Forces organizational psyche. The then Army Air Corps recognized the necessity of consolidating airpower under the command and control of a single airman to mass airpower. This belief in centralized control of airpower became a central reason for the creation of an independent Air Force in 1947. The linkage between centralized control and the origin of the Air Force plays a significant role in Air Force culture. This study examines the Air Forces ability to apply the centralized control approach to irregular warfare. The growing focus and literature on the differences between traditional warfare and irregular warfare challenge the U.S. Air Forces adherence to centralized control. This study asks Is the Air Forces command and control structure able to integrate airpower effectively into Irregular Warfare operations This research question leads to a review of irregular warfare theory and organizational theory and the application of these theories in the current context to determine the effectiveness of centralized control in irregular warfare. The study compares the requirements identified by theory against the Air Forces command and control structure the Theater Air Control System TACS. Subsequent chapters discuss the TACS performance in contemporary irregular warfare environments. The discussion leads to limitations of the TACS in irregular warfare and potential improvements.
- Unconventional Warfare
- Command, Control and Communications Systems