Accession Number:

ADA516131

Title:

Threat Parameters for Operations Other Than War

Descriptive Note:

Corporate Author:

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Personal Author(s):

• Jandora, John W.

Report Date:

1995-01-01

Pagination or Media Count:

14.0

Abstract:

It is generally accepted that since 1989, there are seemingly more crises of wider variance with which the United States must contend. The military implication is that to deal with such a wide range of possibilities, our armed forces must be capable of accomplishing a wide range of missions. I Beyond that, American forces will have to adapt to some unusual mission activities and will consequently have to cope with some unusual threat situations. During the Cold War, the ability of our primary adversary to raise, equip, sustain, and employ military forces was fairly well defined and well understood. The US defense establishment had few doubts regarding Soviet procedures for developing combat systems and mobilizing, deploying, and sustaining forces. It likewise had few doubts regarding Soviet procedures for supplying and otherwise supporting allies and surrogates-whether regime forces or insurgents. During the Gulf War, the Soviet model was applied to the Iraqi army wrongly and sometimes subconsciously. In the end, the false analogy did not matter. Coalition forces destroyed the Iraqi army in Kuwait through superior firepower, logistics, and technology. That victory was made easier than analysts had forecast by easy identification of Iraqi units and supply depots and the enemys static defensive scheme.

Descriptors:

• *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES
• *THREATS
• *MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES)
• EMERGENCIES
• DEFENSE SYSTEMS
• PARAMETERS
• IDENTIFICATION
• SUPPLY DEPOTS
• MISSIONS
• COLD WAR
• STATICS
• FIREPOWER
• CRISIS MANAGEMENT
• IRAQ
• INSURGENCY
• GULFS

Subject Categories:

• Military Forces and Organizations

Distribution Statement:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE